FOI 0128-2025/26 Supreme Court Ruling

Request
Q1. Policies and guidance

a. Please provide copies of any current internal policies, procedures, guidance documents, or internal forms used by your force in relation to the extraction of digital data from victims or witnesses in RASSO investigations.

b. Please provide copies of any standard forms, information packs, or other materials provided to victims or witnesses when requesting access to their mobile phones or proposing a download of their data. 

Q2. Compliance with new legal framework

a. Has your force adopted the new Code of Practice issued under section 37 of the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022? If so, please provide the date of adoption and any associated implementation documents.

b. Has your force issued any training or operational guidance to officers on the use of the Code and the new statutory framework? If so, please provide details (including training materials if available).

Q3. Technology and digital extraction tools

a. What tools or software systems are currently used by your force to extract digital data from mobile phones in the context of RASSO investigations? Are these tools used consistently across all RASSO cases?

b. Are these tools configured to allow selective extraction (i.e. only of relevant material), or are they routinely used for full downloads?

c. Has your force conducted any audits or reviews of the use of digital extraction tools since the introduction of the new legislation and Code of Practice?

Q4. Oversight and accountability

a. Does your force have a panel or mechanism for reviewing RASSO cases where a victim or witness has challenged a request for access to their digital data? If so, does that panel or mechanism remain in place?

b. Does your force collect internal data on how many times digital data has been extracted from victims or witnesses in RASSO cases in the past two calendar years? If yes, please provide those figures.

c. Has your force received any complaints about mobile phone data extraction practices from victims or witnesses in RASSO investigations during the last two years? If so, please provide the number of such complaints. 

Extent and Result of Searches to Locate Information
To locate the information relevant to your request searches were conducted within North Yorkshire Police.

I can confirm that the information you have requested is held by North Yorkshire Police.  

Decision
I have today decided to disclose the following information to you.

Q1a-Q1b. North Yorkshire Police (NYP) have adopted guidance from the National Police Chief's Council's (NPCC) Disclosure Portfolio around Digital Processing Notices. All digital devices processed by NYP have DPN authority in place prior to any examination work being undertaken.  Copies of the DPNa/b/c which we use are as per the below link, but with the addition of the NYP regent crown emblem.
Police update notice for permission to search for relevant information on digital devices. 

Digital Forensics Unit Technical Procedures and Laboratory Extraction Techniques are exempt from disclosure pursuant to Section 31 of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (the Act). Please see the below exemption explanation.

Q2a. Yes. This was fully adopted across the force on 25 April 2022.

Q2b. NYP issued operational guidance to all officers around the usage of DPNa/b/c in April 2022, replacing the temporary form which the NPCC introduced in September 2020 following the judgment handed down by the Court of Appeal in Bater-James and Mohammed [2020] EWCA Crim 790 – For more information see Police update notice for permission to search for relevant information on digital devices. NYP have also circulated the Home Office Code of Practice - Extraction of Information from electronic devices: code of practice and the College of Policing APP Extraction of material from digital devices to all force wide to all officers/staff engaged in briefing circulations.  Whilst there is a RASSO specific briefing available internally, this is also exempt from disclosure pursuant to Section 31 of the Act.

Q3a. The most appropriate forensic tool is selected based on the device type and operating system, e.g. iOS/Android.  All current DFU software is listed on our UKAS Schedule of Accreditation which is available using the below link:

UKAS Schedule of Accreditation

Q3b. Software can be configured on a case-by-case basis dependant on what the victim has consented to provide.  Dependant on what evidential data is required, certain digital devices/operating systems can make selective extraction difficult.  Where selective extraction is technically not possible, victims will be made aware and true/informed consent be sought to obtain additional data.  Suspect devices seized under PACE are subject to full extraction.

Q3c. Yes. Governance around usage of Digital Processing is recorded and monitored and no extraction will be undertaken without relevant authority.

Q4a. No.

Q4b. Yes. 106 in total.

Q4c. No.

Exemption Explanation

Section 17 of the Act requires North Yorkshire Police, when refusing to provide such information (because the information is exempt) to provide you the applicant with a notice which: (a) states that fact, (b) specifies the exemption in question and (c) states (if that would not otherwise be apparent) why the exemption applies.

Section 31 – Law Enforcement – Q1/Q2
Section 31 is a prejudice-based qualified exemption and there is a requirement to articulate the harm as well as carrying out a public interest test.

Evidence of Harm
As you may be aware, disclosure under FOIA is a release to the public at large. Whilst not questioning the motives of the applicant, releasing information around NYP’s Technical Procedures & Laboratory Extraction Techniques or RASSO specific briefings for staff, would allow criminals to note what capacity and tactical capabilities the force had, allowing them to target specific areas of the UK to conduct their criminal/terrorist activities. This would lead to an increase in harm of attacks and compromise Law Enforcement. This would be to the detriment of providing an efficient policing service and a failure in providing a duty of care to all members of the public.

The threat from terrorism cannot be ignored. It is generally recognised that the international security landscape is increasingly complex and unpredictable. Releasing tactical information around digital forensics would hinder operational capabilities as criminals/terrorists would gain a greater understanding of the police’s resources, enabling them to take steps to counter them. It may also suggest the limitations of police capabilities in across the county, which may further encourage criminal/terrorist activity by exposing potential vulnerabilities. This detrimental effect is increased if the request is made to several different law enforcement bodies.

Information that undermines the operational integrity of the police will adversely affect public safety and have a negative impact on both national security and law enforcement.

Factors favouring disclosure under Section 31
Releasing internal policies, procedures, or guidance relating to digital forensics would provide an insight into the police resources and enable the public to have a better understanding of the effectiveness of the police.

It would show how public funds are being spent in relation to protecting the public.

Information would ensure transparency and accountability and enable the public to see what tactics are deployed by the Police Service to tackle/assist in fighting crime.

Factors against disclosure under Section 31
It has been recorded that FOIA releases are monitored by criminals and terrorists and so releasing  this information would undermine and compromise law enforcement and it would also hinder any local, regional or national operations.

It can be argued that there are significant risks associated with providing information in relation to any aspects that can assist criminal planning and that any nation’s security arrangements, by releasing the information, may reveal the relative vulnerability of what we may be trying to protect.

The Police Service would not wish to reveal resource information that would undermine the law enforcement operations and would impact on police resources, as more crime would be committed because criminals/terrorists would know which forces had less/more capability. This in turn would place the public at a greater risk and a fear of crime would be realised, especially for more vulnerable areas.

Balance test
The security of the public and the country is of paramount importance and the Police service will not divulge the resources, if to do so would place the safety of individuals at risk, due to providing freely available (single point) information under such requests and which in turn would undermine National Security or compromise law enforcement.

Whilst there is a public interest in the transparency of policing resources and providing assurance that the police service is appropriately prepared and effectively engaging with the threat posed by various groups or individuals, there is a very strong public interest in safeguarding the integrity of police resources and operations in the highly sensitive areas such as extremism, crime prevention, public disorder and terrorism prevention.

As much as there is public interest in knowing that policing activity is appropriate and balanced this will only be overridden in exceptional circumstances. Having weighed up the factors for and against disclosure, it is my opinion that there is a greater public interest in withholding the information.

Please note that systems used for recording information are not generic, nor are the procedures used locally in capturing the data.  It should be noted therefore that this force’s response to your questions should not be used for comparison purposes with any other responses you may receive.