FOI 0628-2025-26- Palestine Action protest training

Request:

I would like to request all documents and information related to any guidance, training and relevant supporting documents provided to or created by your police force following 5 July 2025, as well as all internal guidance or training delivered by your force as it relates to:

• the policing of the protests in support of Palestine Action or against the proscription of this body, and;
• Online or offline support of the body.

Response:

Extent and Result of Searches to Locate Information

To locate the information relevant to your request searches were conducted within North Yorkshire Police.

I can confirm that some of the information you have requested is held by North Yorkshire Police. 

Decision

I have today decided to disclose the following information to you.

Q1. Please find the attached documents which are eligible for disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (the Act). Please note that some documents are withheld from disclosure pursuant to Section 24 (National security) and Section 31 (Law Enforcement) of the Act. Please see the below exemption explanation. Please also note that parts of the attached documents have been redacted pursuant to Section 23, 24 and Section 31 considerations.

No local training or guidance has been given since the proscription of Palestine Action.

Exemption Explanation

Section 17 of the Act requires North Yorkshire Police, when refusing to provide such information (because the information is exempt) to provide you the applicant with a notice which: (a) states that fact, (b) specifies the exemption in question and (c) states (if that would not otherwise be apparent) why the exemption applies. Please see the exemption explanation below.

Section 24 / Section 31

Sections 24 and 31 are prejudice-based qualified exemption and there is a requirement to articulate the harm as well as carrying out a public interest test.

Evidence of harm

• Disclosure of the information would reveal specific strategies, rationale, intelligence and tactics in relation to the identification and policing of proscribed terrorist groups. This could be used by criminals, those with criminal intent, members of proscribed organisations, and terrorists to undermine and obstruct operational policing, as well as amend their current practices to evade detection. This would consequently be detrimental to the police’s ability to ensure the law is enforced, offenders apprehended, public safety is maintained and threats to the security of the UK are identified and prevented.

• Disclosure of information from multiple forces would result in patterns of police activity, tactical capabilities and operational planning in respect of terrorist proscription and operational planning in relation to the policing of proscribed groups, being identified. Identification via this mapping effect of what may appear less resourced or actively policed areas risks those areas becoming targets for individuals with criminal intent, to exploit. This undermines policing, increasing the risk of crime and threatens public safety. Given the information in question is directly relevant to counter terrorism strategy and policing of proscribed terrorist groups, this in turn impacts upon the overall security of the UK.

• Disclosure of information captured by this request would undermine the effectiveness of current and future police operations and proceedings. It would reveal details of police intelligence and strategy used to counter criminal activity and apprehend offenders.

Public Interest Test:

In favour of disclosure -S24:

The pubic are entitled to know public money is spent in areas of operational policing. Release of the information would facilitate transparency. It would also encourage public debate about how the police prevent and detect crime and uphold the law in terms of proscription of terrorist groups in order to protect the security interests of the UK.

In favour of exemption - S24:

To disclose information would render security measures less effective by revealing details of individual force capabilities which could be put together to formulate a national picture of operational counter terrorism strategy. Taking into account the current security climate within the United Kingdom, no information that may aid a criminal, terrorist or proscribed organisation should be disclosed. To what extend this information may aid terrorism in the UK is not precisely known, but it is clear that a disclosure of information will have an impact on the force’s ability to monitor and police proscribed terrorist groups and terrorists effectively; compromising the security of the UK. 

In favour of disclosure - S31:

Disclosure of information would provide the pubic with better understanding of operational policing, increase public debate and provide information which may allow the public to take steps to better protect themselves. This awareness may also lead to more information being passed to police by the public as they become more alert to suspicious activity.

In favour of exemption - S31:

By disclosing the information, law enforcement tactics would be compromised which would hinder the prevention and detection of crime specific to terrorism. More crime would be committed because members of proscribed terrorist organisations as well as terrorists more widely, would have knowledge of operational capability, tactics, strategy and intelligence which would allow then to operate more effectively as well as avoid detection. This places the public at a significant risk of harm, particularly in areas which may have been perceived to be more vulnerable that others as s result of the mapping effect explained within the harm. Any information which undermines operational law enforcement or places the public at risk is not in the public interest to disclose.

Balance test:

The security of the country is paramount, and the police service will not divulge any information if to do so would place the safety of an individual, the public at large of the national security of the UK at risk. Whilst there is a public interest in transparency of policing and promotion of public debate to improve response, there is a far stronger public interest in safeguarding national security, the integrity of operational policing and keeping the public safe. For these reasons we believe that the balancing test for disclosing the information is not made out in this case.

Please note that systems used for recording information are not generic, nor are the procedures used locally in capturing the data.  It should be noted therefore that this force’s response to your questions should not be used for comparison purposes with any other responses you may receive.